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1. Introduction 
[In 1983-84] behavioral economics essentially did not exist. Kahneman and 
Tversky had written their Econometrica paper on prospect theory, but not very 
many economists had taken much notice. There was no dialogue between 
psychology and economists, and there hadn’t been since Herb Simon’s days as an 
economist. Now much of the credit for what has happened since must go to K&T 
who were so brilliant that economists simply could not ignore them. But I think 
that the value of the Sloan-Sage program should not be neglected. Simply by 
having such a program, a sense of mission was created [..]. 
(Thaler’s letter to Wanner, 27 May, 1992, RAC, emphasis in the original)2 
 
As much as rewarding psychologist Daniel Kahneman (b. 1934) the Nobel 
memorial prize in economics in 2002 was a celebration of his and Amos Tversky's (1937 
– 1996) scientific achievements, it was a recognition of the rapid ascendance of 
behavioral economics (e.g. Sent 2004; Angner and Loewenstein forthcoming; Camerer 
and Loewenstein 2004). Moreover, it was implicitly a recognition of the early support of 
behavioral economics through the Alfred P. Sloan and later Russell Sage Foundation’s 
behavioral economics program, which ran from 1984 through 1992. The primary 
contribution of the Sloan and Russell Sage behavioral economics program were not the 
                                                 
2 A first major source for this article are two interviews with Eric Wanner at the Russell Sage Foundation, 
New York, on 14 April, 2009 and on 7 April, 2010. A second major source are the Russell Sage Archives 
at the Rockefeller Foundation Archives, Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, New York (RAC 
hereafter). A third source are the annual reports of the Sloan Foundation of the 1970s and 1980s, made 
available by the Sloan Foundation. Unless otherwise specified this paper represents a triangulation of these 
three sources. Research at the RAC has been supported by a Grant-In-Aid from the RAC, which is 
gratefully acknowledged. I thank Harro Maas, Craufurd Goodwin, Esther-Mirjam Sent, Malcolm 
Rutherford, Eric Wanner and two anonymous reviewers for comments. Any remaining mistakes are my 
own. 
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resources it provided, which were relatively modest. Instead, the program’s contribution 
lay in nourishing what Richard Thaler (b. 1945) in the above quote aptly calls “a sense of 
mission.” The behavioral economics program catalyzed in the researchers it supported a 
sense of contributing to a new direction of the economic discipline. Partly this reflected 
the common strategy of American foundations to pick an individual or small group of 
scientists and stick with them until scientific success had been achieved (Jones and 
Rahman 2009; Hauptmann 2006). In addition, it reflected the good luck of being at the 
right place and at the right time. But, moreover, it was a consequence of the careful 
management of the program’s director Eric Wanner (b. 1942). This paper shows how the 
various actors involved in the behavioral economics program – Kahneman, Thaler, the 
advisory committee and, particularly, Wanner – constructed a new behavioral economic 
sub-discipline in economics by on the one hand tapping into existing missionary 
sentiments in the economic and psychological disciplines, while on the other hand 
actively shaping this sense of mission.   
As such, this article contributes to broad-scale discussions of post war American 
patronage of the social and behavioral sciences (e.g. Goodwin 1998; Dowie 2001; 
Solovey 2001; Porter and Ross 2003; Mirowski and Sent 2003, 2008; Crowther-Heyck 
2006; Scheiding and Mata 2010), as well as to more detailed studies of patronage (e.g. 
Cochrane 1979; Leonard 1991; Pooley and Solovey 2010; Solovey 2004; Sutton 1987). 
While this literature mostly focuses on the first three post war decades, the present article 
extends the investigation to a more recent period and is the first to discuss the Sloan and 
Russell Sage behavioral economics program. It is to be specified from the outset that 
although the behavioral economics program was loosely connected to Herbert Simon, it 
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was, despite its name, not directly related to the short lived Ford Foundation’s Behavioral 
Sciences Program (1951 – 1957) or to George Katona’s Institute of Social Research at the 
University of Michigan, established in the late 1940s.     
Behavior as a concept encapsulating all acts of the human being – and, more 
controversially, of the animal being – originates in the United States of the early 
twentieth century (Danziger 1997; Senn 1966). Subsequently, this new concept of 
behavior provided the basis for the label of the new approach to psychology baptized 
behaviorism (Mills 1998). Behaviorism in its strictest sense was a scientific program 
which reigned psychology in the 1920s and 1930s. It was after World War Two that 
behavior’s adverbial conjugation ‘behavioral’ was introduced in relation to ‘science’ and 
‘economics.’ As early as 1943 Clark Hull from Yale University spoke about “the 
behavioral (social) sciences” in his Principles of Behavior (Senn 1966). Yet it was only 
after James Miller created the Committee on the Behavioral Sciences at the Psychology 
Department of the University of Chicago in 1949, and the creation of the Ford 
Foundation’s Behavioral Science Program in 1951 that the term became widely used, 
albeit from the start in different ways by its different users (Hammond and Wilby 2006; 
Pooley and Solovey 2010; Berelson 1968; Senn 1966).  
The usage of ‘behavioral economics,’ then, was initially popularized at the 
University of Michigan’s Institute of Social Research in the late 1940s, where Katona 
understood behavioral economics as investigating economic behavior, that is the sub-
class of behavior produced in the course of the agent’s activities in the economy (e.g. 
Festinger and Katz 1953; Juster 2004). Other users of the adverb ‘behavioral’ included 
Ward Edwards, also at the University of Michigan, who, starting in the late 1950s, 
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employed it as the name of his branch of operations research called behavioral decision 
research (Edwards 1954, 1961); and Simon, who in the 1950s and 1960s advanced what 
he labeled behavioral economics as an alternative to the dominant neoclassical school in 
economics (e.g. Simon 1955, 1959, 1962). The label of behavioral economics was later 
picked up by economists who sought to reform the dominant neoclassical view of the day 
along the lines set out by Simon. 
Throughout his career, Edwards was of the opinion that although people may be 
prone to mistakes in their decision making, they are ultimately capable and willing of 
avoiding doing so given the right amount of information and sufficient time. Moreover, 
he was convinced that people want to comply with – what he understood as – the 
normative theories of expected utility theory, Bayesian statistics, and behavioral axioms 
of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and Savage (1954) (Heukelom 2010b). Starting 
in the early 1970s some of Edwards’ students began to question this conviction. Tversky 
in particular questioned whether people indeed by and large behave in accordance with 
the normative theories (e.g. Tversky 1967, 1969, 1972). Tversky’s celebrated work with 
fellow Israeli-psychologist Kahneman, which became known as the heuristics and biases 
program, assumed that people make their decisions on the basis of decision heuristics and 
not on the basis of Savage’s axioms and other normative theories. As a result, Kahneman 
and Tversky argued, these heuristics often produce systematic and predictable biases 
from the predictions of the normative theories (Tversky and Kahneman 1971, 1973, 
1974; Kahneman and Tversky 1972, 1973; Heukelom 2012).   
 An alternative behavioral theory appeared in 1979 as “Prospect Theory: An 
Analysis of Decision under Risk,” published in Econometrica, the article referred to by 
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Thaler in the quote above. In prospect theory, Kahneman and Tversky maintained utility 
maximizing and the other theories of rational decision making of the economists and 
mathematicians as the universal, normative benchmarks by which all decision making 
was to be judged. But in addition they argued that economists had focused too much on 
the normative theories, and that they should devote more energy to developing 
descriptive accounts of human decision behavior. In the second part of the article, 
Kahneman and Tversky provided their own detailed theory of how people actually make 
their decisions, the now famous prospect theory, which argued that after a first heuristics-
based editing phase, the human being makes her decisions from the perspective of a 
context-determined reference point and based on a preference for risk-avoiding in the 
gain-domain and a preference for risk-seeking in the loss-domain. Prospect theory was 
initially picked up by a only few economists, the young Thaler among them (Heukelom 
2011). 
 The major catalyst of Kahneman and Tversky’s work in economics was the 
behavioral economics program of the Sloan and Russell Sage Foundations. The second 
section briefly discusses Wanner’s background and introduces the Sloan and Russell 
Sage Foundations. Section three explores in detail the behavioral economics program 
from start to finish.  
 
2. Eric Wanner and the Alfred P. Sloan and Russell Sage Foundations 
In 1960 psychologists Jerome Bruner and George Miller founded the Center for 
Cognitive Studies at Harvard University. The initiative sprang from their desire to 
formulate a non-behaviorist, cognitive approach to psychology in which the mind’s black 
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box would be opened and decomposed into different interacting compartments. Cohen-
Cole (2007) carefully illuminates how upon its creation the Center was conceived as an 
interdisciplinary institution which through its organization and its separate location from 
the rest of the Harvard campus, would actively pursue cross-fertilization of different 
scientific disciplines related to cognition, including psychology, linguistics, philosophy, 
biology, mathematics, anthropology, pediatrics, history, psychiatry and psychoanalysis. 
The psychologists involved included among others Bärbel Inhelder and Daniel 
Kahneman, participating linguists were for instance Noam Chomsky and Jerry Fodor, 
while decision theory and industrial administration was represented by Herbert Simon. 
 The interdisciplinary focus of the Center’s founders also influenced their students. 
Wanner started his dissertation research as a psychologist in 1967 under the supervision 
of Miller, but when Miller left for Rockefeller University in 1969 before Wanner had 
finished writing, the supervision was transferred to psycholinguist Roger Brown. Yet, 
Wanner’s dissertation on experimental psycholinguistics – an experimental psychological 
investigation of Chomskyan linguistics – remained more an example of Miller’s 
interdisciplinary cognitive psychology than a further exploration of the language 
acquisition research Brown had specialized in (e.g. Brown 1965; Bellugi and Brown 
1971). After completing his dissertation in 1969 Wanner was hired as an assistant 
professor at Harvard’s department of psychology, among others to teach the course 
Miller had left vacant after leaving Harvard. Wanner’s career initially developed along 
common academic lines. He completed a partial revision of his dissertation in 1972, 
which was published at Mouton in 1974, and further developed his experimental 
psycholinguistic research in a number of articles (e.g. Wanner 1973; Wanner, Kaplan and 
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Shiner 1975; Wanner and Shiner 1976). Following a conference at the University of 
Pennsylvania in 1978, Wanner and Lila Gleitman edited and wrote the introductory 
chapter to “Language Acquisition, The State of the Art” (1982), published at Cambridge 
University Press.  
 However, in the second half of the 1970s, Wanner gradually left the active 
practice of science. In 1976, Wanner joined Harvard University Press as an editor, where 
he initiated the Cognitive Science Series. The Cognitive Science Series aimed to provide 
up-to-date overviews of different subject area’s within cognitive science. As such, its 
scope was similar to the scientific landscape the Center for Cognitive Studies had aimed 
to cover a decade earlier. The Cognitive Science Series ran from 1979 to 1989 and 
eventually consisted of nine volumes, many written by foremost cognitive scientists such 
as John R. Anderson, and Steven Pinker. As many other scientific series, the Cognitive 
Science Series had an advisory board which invited, selected and reviewed the books at 
their different stages of development, and a number of whose members were themselves 
authors of books in the Series. Wanner managed to get many prominent cognitive 
scientists on the forty-six member advisory board, including Fodor, Anderson, Chomsky, 
Robert Abelson, Donald Davidson, Hilary Putnam, John Searle, his former supervisors 
Miller and Brown and his former co-authors Gleitman and Kaplan.   
 The advisory board also included Kahneman and Tversky. As said, Kahneman 
had been a member of Bruner and Miller’s Center for Cognitive Studies in the early 
1960s, and Kahneman’s book Attention and Effort (1973) had been well-received among 
cognitive psychologists (Dawes – interview 2008). In addition, Wanner had been aware 
of Kahneman’s research from the time of his dissertation research onwards, as 
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Kahneman’s research on attention and cognitive errors was more or less related to 
Wanner’s own research on experimental psycholinguistics. Wanner, Kaplan and Shiner 
(1975), for instance, referred to Wright and Kahneman (1971). Moreover, as Wanner 
recalls, Kahneman and Tversky’s collaborative research had been brought to his attention 
from the early 1970s onwards by colleagues at Harvard, so that by the late 1970s he was 
generally familiar with their work. Also the later famous prospect theory article in 
Econometrica was brought to Wanner’s attention relatively early, in 1980 or 1981. Yet, it 
was only when Kahneman and Tversky agreed to be on the Cognitive Science Series’ 
advisory board that Wanner acquainted them personally. That is to say, as two members 
of a forty-six member advisory board. Wanner got to know them better after he had 
moved to the Sloan Foundation in 1982.  
Both in the size of their funds and in their visibility private foundations are a 
twentieth century American phenomenon (Weaver 1967, p.xv; Goodwin 1998; Leonard 
1991; Grossman 1982). In the interwar period, only four of these foundations provided 
substantial support to economists: the Carnegie philanthropies, the Rockefeller 
philanthropies, the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, and the Russell Sage Foundation 
(Goodwin 1998, p.74). After the Second World War, the Ford Foundation joined their 
ranks with a generous program supporting economists (Leonard 1991). The foundations 
were self-conscious in their support of economics, which had to serve the advancement of 
some larger social purpose like the alleviation of poverty, maintenance of full 
employment, or protection of the environment. In other words, economics had to be 
useful (Pooley and Solovey 2010; Crowther-Heyck 2006). For that reason a general 
strategy was to select one or a few scientists that best fitted the social purpose the 
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foundation had in mind, and then to stay with this individual or individuals until the 
objectives had been achieved (Jones and Rahman 2009; Hauptmann 2006).3  
Throughout the twentieth century, Sloan Foundation’s board of trustees was 
dominated by present and former presidents of General Motors; presidents of financial 
institutions such as Morgan Stanley, American Express and Mutual Life Insurance; high-
ranking government bureaucrats such as a Secretary of State and World Bank President; 
and professors and science administrators such as a President of the National Academy of 
Sciences and a Director of the Institute of Advanced Studies. The behavioral economics 
program was a Sloan program from 1984 to 1989.4 In sharp contrast to the Sloan 
Foundation, the board of trustees of the Russell Sage Foundation in the post war period 
predominantly consisted of accomplished professors of the social and behavioral 
sciences, including sociologists, political scientists, economists, and historians. The 
behavioral economics program ran at the Russell Sage Foundation from 1986 to 1992.5  
                                                 
3 One of the most explicit and successful foundation managers in this regard has been Warren Weaver (e.g. 
Weaver 1967), among others a foundation officer of the Sloan Foundation in the 1940s – 1950s and an 
example to Wanner.  
4 Important trustees in this period, because of their passive or active support of the behavioral economics 
program, were Albert Rees (1921 – 1992), Sloan trustee and president from 1979 to 1989; and Thomas 
Murphy, a former chairman of the board of General Motors, trustee of the Sloan Foundation from 1980 to 
1988, and its chair from 1982 to 1988. The other Sloan trustees of this period were Luce Benson (1981 – 
1999), Manning Brown (1970 – 1985), Stephen Brown (1986 – present), Marvin Goldberger (1987 – 
1992), Lloyd C. Elam (1975 – 2007), Parker Gilbert (1986 – 2004), Ralph Gomory (1988 – 2007), Howard 
Johnson (member 1982 – 1995, chairman 1988 – 1995), Howard Kehrl (1987 – 1995), Donald Langenberg 
(1983 – 2006), Franklin Long (1970 – 1983), Herbert Longenecker (1971 – 1984), Cathleen Morawetz 
(1980 – 1995), Ellmore Patterson (1966 – 1986), Frank Petito (1975 – 1986), Frank Press (1981 – 1997), 
Lewis Preston (1986 – 1994), James Robinson III (1982 – 1990), Charles Scanlon (1972 – 1988), Harold 
Shapiro (1980 – present), and Roger Smith (1988 – 2002). 
5 Important trustees in this period were Wanner, trustee and President since 1986; former Citigroup CEO 
John Reed, trustee from 1975 to 1987, its chair from 1984 to 1987 and re-instated as trustee from 1990 to 
2000; business man and Republican government official Gary MacDougal, trustee from 1981 to 1991 and 
chair from 1987 to 1991; and psychologist James March, trustee from 1984 to 1994, and chair from 1990 to 
1993. In contrast to the Sloan Foundation, Russell Sage Foundation trustees in principle were elected for a 
five year term and could be re-elected only once, with the exception of the President and John Reed. The 
other Russell Sage Foundation trustees of this period were Marshall Robinson (trustee and President, 1979 
– 1986), Carl Kaysen (1979 – 1986), Earl Cheit (1979 – 1989), Madelon Talley (1979 – 1989), Gardner 
Lindzey (1980 – 1990), Patricia King (1981 – 1991), Renee Fox (1981 – 1987), Philip Converse (1982 – 
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A major difference between the Sloan and Russell Sage Foundation was the 
amount of annual funds available for grants. Table 1 below shows that throughout the six 
years of its existence, the behavioral economics program was a relatively small program 
at the Sloan Foundation. By contrast, the Russell Sage Foundation’s total annual 
endowments between 1986 and 1992 were much smaller than those of the Sloan 
Foundation, and the share spent on the behavioral economics program thus larger.  
Table 1 
Year ASF total ASF Beh Ec RSF total RSF Beh Ec 
1984 $17,083,690 $36.000 (0.2%)   
1985 $19,234,455 $97,000 (0.5%)   
1986 $18,721,037 $430,500 (2.3%) $878,874 $200,000 (22.8%) 
1987 $20,758,106 $310,000 (1.5%) $816,808 $398,200 (48.8%) 
1988 $25,526,826 $217,000 (0.9%) $916,112 $358,016 (39.1%) 
1989 $17,227,448 $458,561 (2.7%) $1,267,776 $342,190 (27.0%) 
1990   $1,801,063 $96,827 (5.4%) 
1991   $1,594,293 $180,680 (11.3%) 
1992   $1,522,220 $293,500 (19.3%) 
Total $118,551,562 $1,549,061 (1.3%) $8,797,146 $1,869,413 (21.3%) 
Total annual endowments and annual behavioral economics endowments of the Sloan and Russell 
Sage Foundations. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
1992), Mortimer Zuckerman (1984 – 1986), Anne Pitts Carter (1987 – 1997), Howard Raiffa (1987 – 
1997), Harold Tanner (1988 – 1998), William Wilson (1988 – 1998), Joel Cohen (1989 – 1998), Peggy 
Davis (1989 – 1998), Neil Smelser (1990 – 2000), Phoebe Ellsworth (1991 – 2001), Marta Tienda (1991 – 
2001), and Ira Katznelson (1992 – 2002).        
 11
3. The behavioral economics program 
The behavioral economics program was created at the Sloan Foundation in 1984 under 
the presidency of Rees. An accomplished labor economist, Rees obtained his PhD from 
the University of Chicago in 1950, where he stayed until 1966, serving as the editor of 
the Journal of Political Economy from 1954 to 1959 and as chair of the economics 
department from 1962 to 1966. During the 1950s and 1960s, the economics department 
of the University of Chicago was an exception to the formalist, neoclassical sway that 
ruled the majority of economics departments (Blaug 2003; Emmet 2010; Rizvi 2003). 
Inspired and dominated by George Stigler and Milton Friedman, the so-called Chicago 
School in economics was neoclassical, but much more empirical and Marshallian in its 
focus than the other economics departments. In addition, it was characterized 
ideologically by a strong and outspoken free-market libertarianism (Emmet 2010).  
While Rees was clearly a product of, and a life-long contributor to the 
Marshallian and empirical focus of Chicago, his political views were more nuanced 
(Ashenfelter and Pencavel 2010; Ashenfelter 1990; Levy 1992). He served Democratic 
and Republican Presidents in various (sub-)committees and councils, and despite his 
outspoken support of the free market also noted for instance that “Competition does not 
make sense where it involves great waste through duplication of facilities” (Rees quoted 
in McCleery 1976, p. 14). In addition, Rees advocated exploring the implication of John 
Rawls’ Theory of Justice for economics, and regretted that “There is not as much interest 
in history among economists and economics students as there used to be, and that may be 
too bad” (Rees quoted in McCleery 1976, p.15). Towards the end of his life Rees 
described himself in a letter to a colleague and friend as “a labor economist who (despite 
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a Chicago Ph.D.) is a rabid Keynesian, at least on this issue [of wage rigidity]  (Rees’ 
letter to Lebergott, 8 February, 1989, Box 1, Rees Papers, Duke University Libraries). 
Perhaps that explains why Rees moved to Princeton University in 1966. The central 
theme in Rees’ research was the economics of labor markets, including the proper public 
policy role of trade unions, wage differences between sectors and social groups, and the 
determinants of individual trade-offs between leisure and income (e.g. Rees 1963, 1973; 
Rees and Schultz 1970). Later in his career Rees sought to apply his research more 
directly to policy making, both in his writings (Rees 1984) and as the chair of the new 
Council on Wage and Price Stability, created by President Ford in 1974.   
In 1979, Rees became trustee and President of the Sloan Foundation, which at the 
time had $250 million in assets and gave $15 million in grants a year. Three years later, 
Rees managed to persuade Wanner to join the Sloan Foundation as a program officer to 
take care of Sloan’s cognitive science program, impressed as Rees probably was by 
Wanner’s Cognitive Science Series at Harvard University Press. The Sloan Foundation’s 
cognitive science program had been running for some ten years and during his years at 
Harvard Wanner had been a researcher on one of the program’s projects. However, 
managing the cognitive science program was not too interesting a job for the newly 
recruited program officer “because really all the big grants had been made and it was just 
a matter of tying everything up and writing reports to finish it off and so forth” (Wanner - 
interview 2009). Therefore, Wanner set out to look for something new to do. His first 
proposal was a new program on decision theory. The idea was straightforward enough. 
The Sloan Foundation had had a program on neuroscience in the 1960s and on cognitive 
science in the 1970s and early 1980s, so a natural continuation would be the application 
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of cognitive science to decision making. But Rees judged Wanner’s plans too ambitious, 
not in the least because Wanner proposed to spend some $20 million on the project. Thus 
Wanner had to look for something cheaper and more confined.  
Wanner’s next plan was to concentrate on the application of cognitive science to 
economics. The new plan gradually sharpened during 1982 and 1983. Early 1983 Wanner 
mentioned as “a possible area for investment” for the Sloan Foundation the theme of 
“what might be called the psychological foundations of economic behavior” (Wanner’s 
letter to Fischoff, 26 January, 1983, RAC). During a conversation between Wanner, 
Kahneman and Tversky a few months later in which they explored the topic, the two star 
psychologists were not very optimistic, reasoning that to get economists’ attention 
psychologists would have to be more economically sophisticated than they actually were, 
and advised Wanner not to spend too much money on the project, if anything at all (see 
also Kahneman 2002). Nevertheless, over the course of 1983 “behavioral economics” as 
the name for the new program emerged and Wanner planned a few exploratory meetings 
with Kahneman and Tversky, and through them with Thaler. As a result, word was 
spread in the academic community that the Sloan Foundation was considering setting up 
a new program on behavioral economics, and during the second half of 1983 the first 
unsolicited grant requests started coming in. The only application that was considered 
and funded by Wanner and Rees in 1983 was a proposal by Thaler to spend a sabbatical 
with Kahneman at the University of British Columbia. However, after the program 
officially commenced also the other early proposals were reviewed and decided upon. 
Throughout this whole process, Wanner worked closely with Rees on the new program, 
who as an empirically-oriented Marshallian Chicago economist was skeptical but tolerant 
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towards the idea that an empirically-grounded psychology could be usefully employed in 
economics.  
Rees and Wanner started by composing an advisory committee to the program 
that would review the incoming proposals and award the funds available. To avoid that 
one of the two groups that the program aimed to bring together would dominate the other 
and to ensure that it would be an interdisciplinary program, Wanner and Rees decided 
that there should be two psychologists and two economists on the advisory committee. 
Also the label “behavioral economics” was understood to be deliberately half 
psychology-half economics. The first person they picked for the advisory committee was 
Leon Festinger, a social psychologist and colleague of Katona in the Institute of Social 
Research at the University of Michigan in the 1950s. In addition, Festinger had been 
involved with the Sloan Foundation’s cognitive science program and was interested in 
economics. Second, Wanner approached economist Thomas Schelling, whom Wanner 
knew from Harvard and whose work on paradoxes and conflict strategies seemed related 
to the new program (e.g. Schelling 1960, 1969). Rees recommended economist William 
Baumol, an organization theorist and early critic of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s 
axiomatic approach to decision making (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944; Baumol 
1951). The fourth member Wanner and Rees agreed on and who accepted was cognitive 
psychologist Abelson, a member of the advisory board of the Cognitive Science Series 
Wanner had initiated at Harvard University Press.  
In May 1984, the Sloan Foundation supported a conference at Princeton 
University on the behavioral assumptions of economic theory. During the conference, 
Wanner had a discussion over dinner with the prospective members of the advisory 
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committee as well as with Kahneman, Tversky and Thaler on who might be the 
appropriate researchers to invite for the new behavioral economics program. After the 
dinner, Kahneman, Tversky and Thaler discussed possible names in more detail and 
individually made more or less similar suggestions to Wanner. Then, mid-June 1984, the 
board of trustees of the Sloan Foundation officially installed the advisory committee and 
endowed it with $250,000 to fund a number of “seed projects” in subsequent years, to see 
if the program could work (Wanner’s notes on the advisory committee meeting, 7 
December, 1984, RAC).6 As is clear from Table 1, the amount of money spent on the 
behavioral economics by the Sloan Foundation was comparatively small and the board of 
trustees basically took Rees’ word for it. Thus, while the idea and organization of the new 
behavioral economics program was entirely Wanner’s, the skeptical but tolerant support 
of Rees in the background was crucial.  
As early as July 1984, Abelson expressed a view that seems to have been shared 
by the other advisory committee members as well as by Wanner, namely that Kahneman 
and Thaler should be at the center of the new program: “Getting Thaler and Kahneman 
together is bound to produce progress. Their teamwork could be as seminal as the 
Tversky and Kahneman pairing, but more market oriented” (Abelson’s letter to Wanner, 
26 July, 1984, RAC). The first behavioral economics meeting was planned for 7 
December, 1984 at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York. In addition to the advisory 
committee and Kahneman and Thaler the following economists and psychologists were 
invited: Hillel Einhorn, Baruch Fischoff, Donald Hood, Thomas Juster, Charles Plott, 
                                                 
6 The advisory committee members were paid $300 per day of discussion at Sloan’s headquarters in New 
York, of which three to four were held each year between 1984 and 1989. In 1988, the arrangement 
changed to a fixed amount of $1500 per year regardless of the number of meetings.  
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Howard Kunreuther, Howard Raiffa, Herbert Simon, Oliver Williamson, and Richard 
Zeckhauser.7      
Simon was unable to attend or to get directly involved in the new program, as 
anticipated by Kahneman, Thaler and others during the Princeton meeting. Nevertheless, 
Simon attached “the highest importance to the exploratory program you [Wanner] are 
starting,” and hoped to “be of some help to you [Wanner] in its further development” 
(Simon’s letter to Wanner, 5 December, 1984, RAC). Moreover, Simon stressed that “a 
major component in any program that is mounted in behavioral economics should be 
directed at securing training for doctoral students and young economists in the techniques 
of making field studies, getting information directly from executives in business firms, 
and possibly also running experiments,” which also had been recurring themes in 
Simon’s criticisms of neoclassical economics in the 1950s and 1960s (Simon 1955, 1959, 
1962). 
When the first exploratory meeting took place on 7 December 1984 the 
participants advanced and discussed a number of possible projects, which then could be 
worked out into more detailed proposals by the participants individually. In a separate 
meeting between the general discussion and drinks and dinner, Wanner and the advisory 
committee convened to discuss and make decisions on the first few proposals received. 
This format was often repeated in the behavioral economics meetings during 1984-1986. 
In a morning and/or afternoon session the economists and psychologists invited advanced 
and discussed their tentative ideas for new projects and directions into which the program 
                                                 
7 It is not completely clear why Tversky was not invited. As his advice was solicited from the start, the only 
possible explanation seems to be that for unknown reasons he did not want get involved in the exploratory 
meetings. 
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could develop, after which the advisory committee convened to decide on the proposals 
sent to them in advance by Wanner.8  
Simon was considered to be one of the creators of behavioral economics and in 
addition was the towering 1978 Nobel memorial laureate. However, from the start he was 
not expected to be much involved because he was busy and because he had moved away 
from his earlier psychological criticisms of neoclassical economics’ behavioral 
assumptions.9 Yet, in its early stages the new behavioral economics program was clearly 
understood as a further exploration and advancement of Simon’s behavioral economics. 
Not only did Wanner, Kahneman, Thaler and the others involved adopt Simon’s label of 
“behavioral economics” without any apparent discussion, also Simon’s language and 
ideas are clearly visible in the early program statements and objectives. For instance, in a 
letter to Sloan’s board of trustees in mid 1985 the advisory committee remarked that  
 
progress in this new field will depend on moving beyond laboratory 
demonstrations of the inaccuracy of the behavioral assumptions employed in 
economics and toward efforts to develop and test more behaviorally sophisticated 
economic theory. Accordingly, the Committee recommends a funding program in 
1986 offering support for research on behavioral economic models, for 
observational studies of economic decision making in real settings, and for 
simulated market experiments designed to examine the market consequences of 
individual psychological processes. 
                                                 
8 The complete list of the Sloan and Russell Sage Foundation grants between 1984 and 1992 is available 
from the author upon request. 
9 Something similar held for Arrow, but further in the background. Arrow was seen as ally and it seems his 
support was actively sought. Yet Arrow chose not to become directly involved. Later on, in 1986, Arrow 
successfully applied for a $30.000 grant for a “Research Seminar on Behavioral Economics.”  
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(Advisory committee’s letter to Sloan’s board of trustees, no date (+/- mid 1985), 
RAC) 
 
But the new behavioral economics program was also understood to move beyond 
Simon’s earlier criticisms of neoclassical economics, by focusing on the systematic 
distortions of Kahneman and Tversky rather than on the random limits on rational 
decision making of Simon. Thus, while initially the major source of inspiration was 
Simon, during 1985, Wanner, Kahneman, Thaler and the advisory committee quickly 
developed their own focus and language. First of all, the new program was focused more 
specifically on “the potential contribution of psychology and other behavioral sciences to 
the study of financial markets” (Wanner’s letter to “Everyone,” no date (+/- early 
October, 1985), RAC), in particular because “financial markets are often considered the 
most efficient of markets and thus might be thought to be the most immune to non-
rational factors” (ibid). Anomalies of rational behavior would hence have their strongest 
impact on theories of financial markets, and alternative behavioral theories that 
incorporate the “non-rational” behavior would be most visible there. To make this focus 
stand out more clearly, the label of “behavioral finance” was appropriated as one area of 
behavioral economic research.10 Moreover, the program’s organizers stressed that “for 
the [11 October, 1985] meeting to be most productive, we cannot afford to get too 
bogged down in discussions of whether or a not a particular empirical finding is or is not 
                                                 
10 Thaler recalls: “I am not sure how that name [behavioral finance] emerged but by the time I wrote my 
first finance paper in 1985 with De Bondt [De Bondt and Thaler 1985], the term behavioral economics was 
being used for the kind of economics I and some others were doing so BF [behavioral finance] became the 
natural term for the application of these ideas to financial economics” (email Thaler to author, 14 January, 
2009). 
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an anomaly, i.e. whether there exists some explanation within the rational, maximizing, 
economic paradigm. Rather, we should try to work toward an evaluation of competing 
explanations, and the evidence that might be used to discriminate between behavioral 
hypotheses” (ibid). In other words, the program’s organizers – Wanner, Kahneman, 
Thaler and the advisory committee – actively tried to prevent a theoretical, economic 
discussion of neoclassical economic theory, and in advance tried to steer the discussions 
towards behavioral terms.  
In addition, on behalf of the Sloan board of trustees Wanner asked the advisory 
committee members prior to the 11 October, 1985 meeting to reflect on the possible 
future of the behavioral economics program. Wanner offered three possibilities: 1) “close 
up shop,” 2) Finish the funds provided and then stop, and 3) “to move the program ahead 
into a somewhat more substantial phase” (Wanner’s letter to the advisory committee, 2 
October, 1985, RAC). The eventual decision by the board of trustees, which essentially 
was a careful balance between the positions of Wanner, Rees, and the advisory 
committee, was something in between options 2) and 3). The document noted that 
although the behavioral economics program up until then had “been an extremely 
interesting exercise, it has nevertheless left us with the conclusion that behavioral 
economics is largely a promise to be fulfilled” (Wanner’s letter to unspecified, no date 
(+/- November, 1985), RAC). Moreover, “[t]he promise upon which behavioral 
economics rests is that such anomalies [of rational economic behavior – FH] might be 
rendered explicable by means of new economic models that employ more realistic 
behavioral assumptions than those of standard theory. But delivery on this promise is still 
pending. In the meantime, simply accumulating more demonstrations of anomalies or of 
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the unrealistic character of foundational assumptions seems unlikely to have a serious 
impact on mainstream economics” (ibid). Therefore, the Sloan Foundation would support 
work along the lines of 1) “efforts to develop economic models on the basis of behavioral 
principles,” 2) “observational studies of economic decision making in real settings,” and 
3) “experiments with simulated markets designed to examine the market consequences of 
individual and social psychological processes” (ibid). Moreover, the board of trustees 
was only willing to do so on the condition that the Sloan Foundation’s staff would “stay 
in fairly close contact with all projects on the 1986 round,” that all grantees would agree 
to occasional “visits by Foundation staff and/or the program’s advisory committee” and 
would agree to the possible request “that grantees hold a brief symposium on their work-
in-progress” (Wanner’s letter to list of forty invited researchers, 18 December, 1985, 
RAC). With these extra precautions put into place, the Sloan Foundation agreed to a 
substantial increase of the number of grants from four in 1985 (three between $25.000 
and $35.000 and one of $6.000), to twelve in 1986 (all between $20.000 and $63.000). 
Thus, the behavioral economics program continued for another year.  
The first real test of the new behavioral economics program was a conference on 
“The Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory,” 10-15 June, 1986, organized by 
Robyn Hogarth and Melvin Reder at the University of Chicago.11 The conference did not 
go very well for the members of the Sloan behavioral economics program: 
 
                                                 
11 Late 1984 Hogarth and Reder had applied for financial support at Sloan through the new program. The 
proposal was declined by the advisory committee because it had already decided to sponsor the similar 
conference at Princeton University late 1984.  
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[Eric Wanner:] In the old days people tried to kill [behavioral economics]. You 
talked about behavioral finance… I remember a conference that we ran in 
probably 1985 at the University of Chicago.  
[Floris Heukelom:] That’s 1986. It’s the… 
[EW:] Good, you know all about it. Really the finance economists were out to kill 
them. People like Merton Miller… I’m trying to think… [..] some of those papers 
are brutal. They’re basically just efforts to ridicule behavioral finance, and to kind 
of laugh it out of existence. So in those days it really was a hard thing to do. 
(Wanner, interview with the author, 14 April, 2009) 
 
In the meantime, the number of researchers invited to participate in the behavioral 
economics program had expanded to forty names in December 1985, including George 
Akerloff, Kenneth Arrow, Robert Frank, David Grether, Robyn Hogarth, George 
Loewenstein, Mark Machina, James March, Richard Nelson, Charles Plott, Howard 
Raiffa, Robert Shiller, Vernon Smith, Lawrence Summers, and Sidney Winter. All forty 
researchers were told that “[t]he Sloan Foundation has decided to develop a limited 
funding program in behavioral economics in 1986. The purpose of this letter is to 
describe the program briefly and to invite you to consider making an application” 
(Wanner’s letter to forty invited researchers, 18 December, 1985, RAC). 12 
Also Simon was of course on the list of the now forty invited economists and 
psychologists. While Simon had been quite supportive of the new program in his first 
                                                 
12 To give an impression of the projects funded, the 1986 round funded Akerlof with $30.000 for a project 
on “Near Rational Behavior and its Market Consequences,” Einhorn and Hogarth with $63.000 for reseacrh 
on “A New Model of Decision under Uncertainty,” Smith and Isaac with $50.000 for an experiment on 
“Market Anomalies, Computerized Matching Markets, and Public Goods Provisions,” and Thaler with 
$27.000 for a project on “Continued Research on the Economic Consequences of Beliefs about Fairness.” 
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response to Wanner a year earlier, he now offered some critical remarks on the approach 
taken by Wanner, Kahneman, Thaler and the advisory committee. According to Simon, 
Wanner’s new program took “too seriously the premises of contemporary economic 
methodology that theories (‘models’) come first and empirical work afterwards” 
(Simon’s letter to Wanner, 6 January, 1986, RAC). In addition, Simon noted that 
following his own work of the late 1950s a “considerable body of empirical work” (ibid) 
had already been built. The problem was not that the empirical work was not there, but 
that economists had not noticed it, as “mainline economists continue to ignore vast bodies 
of relevant evidence in their preferred pursuit of armchair model building” (ibid). 
Therefore, Simon considered “rather insulting” (ibid) the behavioral economics 
program’s first objective to “develop economic models on the basis of behavioral 
principles and to show that such models represent a clear improvement over traditional 
models, either in terms of accuracy or empirical coverage” (Wanner’s letter to forty 
invited researchers, 18 December, 1985, RAC). That said, Simon was “greatly mollified” 
by the list of people invited, which he considered to be “just the right people” who would 
not “be put off by the things I object to in your letter” (Simon, letter to Wanner, 6 
January, 1986, RAC). Out of courtesy, Wanner and the advisory committee decided to 
invite Simon for discussion and dinner after one of the advisory committee meetings. 
Following this meeting, Simon continued to be a background consultant to the program.  
During the same period, Wanner stepped up his efforts to encourage researchers 
to send in a proposal or to collaborate with one another. Following a short but cordial 
note from Stanford psychologist, former collaborator of Simon, and Russell Sage 
Foundation trustee James March – one of the new names on the list of researchers invited 
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– Wanner responded by suggesting March could put together a proposal with fellow 
Stanford researchers Arrow and Tversky who seemed “interested in making a proposal 
for support for graduate or post doctoral students” (Wanner’s letter to March, 10 January, 
1986, RAC). Quickly thereafter, March became involved with the behavioral economics 
program in another way as well. After being promoted to the position of Vice-President 
of the Sloan Foundation in the summer of 1985, Wanner was appointed as a trustee and 
President of the Russell Sage Foundation in the summer of 1986. He started officially on 
October 1st, 1986. Wanner hinted to the behavioral economics advisory committee that he 
suspected a positive recommendation by some of them might have had something to do 
with this appointment: “Some of you may even have had a hand in advising Russell Sage 
to talk this rash step, in which case I am both in awe of your persuasive powers, and 
extremely grateful for them” (Wanner’s letter to the advisory committee, 21 August, 
1986, RAC). At the same time, Wanner realized that this would probably mean that “this 
program will not be continued at Sloan after I leave” (Wanner’s letter to March, 22 July, 
1986, RAC) and organized a meeting with March to discuss the possibility of 
“transplanting some version of it [the behavioral economics program] to Russell Sage” 
(ibid). March quickly responded that he “was delighted that you [Wanner] started it [the 
behavioral economics program] and would be equally delighted if we continued it at the 
Russell Sage” (March’s letter to Wanner, 29 July, 1986, RAC). 13 
But of course there were more members of the board of trustees of the Russell 
Sage Foundation to be convinced of adopting another Foundation’s behavioral economics 
                                                 
13 Another program Wanner was working on during his early years at the Russell Sage Foundation was the 
“Persistence of Poverty” program.  
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program. It was by no means self-evident that the Russell Sage trustees would approve. 
As March recalls  
 
I think the Board generally felt the program had few prospects for social 
usefulness (i.e., did not fit the general philosophy of the foundation). I and one or 
two others felt the scientific value warranted support and argued for the program; 
but I think most of the Board voted to approve the program primarily as a kind of 
reward to Eric Wanner for his good work. If it had not come from Eric, it would 
not have been approved. 
(email March to author, 4 April, 2010) 
 
Thus, after some negotiation, Wanner could report to the advisory committee that “the 
RSF Board approved the idea of a joint program with the Sloan Foundation” (Wanner’s 
letter to the advisory committee, 18 February, 1987, RAC). However, there were two 
conditions, or at least strong suggestions. First, the “RSF would be particularly interested 
in supporting an extension of the program which includes sociologists, organization 
theorists, and other social scientists, in addition to the nexus of cognitive psychologists 
and economists so far funded in the program” (Wanner’s letter to the advisory committee, 
18 February, 1987, RAC). Second, the board of trustees of the Russell Sage Foundation 
wanted some influence in the behavioral economics advisory committee. Wanner set out 
to meet both requirements.  
 The first requirement proved to be difficult. Wanner suggested to the advisory 
committee that “t]here is still quite a lot of work to be done on this border between 
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psychology and economics. But one might take a different view. For instance, I enclose 
(agnostically) a paper of Amitai Etzioni’s which outlines his vision of what he calls 
social-economics” (Wanner’s letter to the behavioral economics advisory committee, 16 
October, 1986, RAC). The advisory committee was not impressed. Baumol, for instance, 
replied that “I would indeed be prepared to entertain proposals by psychologists or 
economists that call for participation of persons from other social science disciplines. 
However, I think it would broaden the program excessively to invite proposals from 
sources outside our two focal disciplines” (Baumol’s letter to Wanner, 17 November, 
1986, RAC). That effectively ended the attempt to broaden the program to include social-
economics.  
 The second requirement on the other hand was quickly met. The board of trustees 
of Russell Sage suggested that one of its members, March, could be on the advisory 
committee. Wanner and the advisory committee were in favor but also feared that this 
would tip the balance too much to psychology.14 Thus, in a letter dated 17 February 
Wanner and Rees (still President of the Sloan Foundation) invited March to join the 
advisory committee, which invitation March accepted, while at the same time Rees, as a 
labor economist, was asked by the advisory committee to join its ranks. As a result, the 
advisory committee now consisted of six members, three psychologists and three 
economists. It was headed by the President of the Russell Sage Foundation and had on its 
advisory committee both the President of the Sloan Foundation and a trustee of the 
Russell Sage Foundation.  
                                                 
14 In addition, Wanner, March and the advisory committee members saw some potential juridical problems 
in this arrangement, but also all were sure these could be worked out, which they were.  
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Having Rees on the advisory committee in particular seems to have helped to 
ensure at least another few years of Sloan support for the program – thus positively 
defying Wanner’s earlier fears of the end of the behavioral economics program at the 
Sloan Foundation as expressed in his letter to March. With the two new members on the 
advisory committee, the behavioral economics program proceeded.15 From the start, 
however, the behavioral economics program had a different status at Russell Sage as 
compared to Sloan, and not only because Wanner was the President of Russell Sage. At 
Sloan, the board of trustees simply took President Rees’ word for the small behavioral 
economics program. Table 1 shows that the amount of grants awarded to the behavioral 
economics program never exceeded 2.7% of the total amount of grants issued. At Russell 
Sage, however, the behavioral economics program consumed a much larger portion of 
annual spending, up to nearly 50% in 1987.16  
                                                 
15 On top of the twelve grants from the Sloan Foundation in 1986 already mentioned, the behavioral 
economics program issued its first support from the Russell Sage Foundation in 1986 in the form of a 
$200.000 grant to Kahneman and Tversky for a new book on “Decisions: Rationality and Illusion in 
Judgment and Choice.” Writing the book proved difficult, however. Eventually, a new collection of 
Kahneman and Tversky’s papers entitled  Choices, Values, and Frames was published in 2000.  
16
Another important development around this time was Thaler’s anomalies columns for the Journal of 
Economic Perspectives (JEP). In 1986, the journal’s founding editors, Joseph Stiglitz, Carl Shapiro and 
Timothy Taylor decided that one element of their new journal would be “features,” a series of short papers 
around one theme of which one would appear in every issue of the journal. As Taylor recalls: “We started 
with three features: a ‘Recommendations for Further Reading’ feature written by Bernard Saffran, an 
‘Economic Puzzles’ feature written by Barry Nalebuff, and the ‘Anomalies’ feature written by Richard 
Thaler. My memory is that Joe and Carl had Thaler in mind pretty much from Day 1. They had talked with 
Dick, and he had a list of potential topics pretty much ready to go. [..] Our original plan with the 
‘Anomalies’ column was that it would include a range of anomalies: micro, macro, even theory or 
econometrics. However, getting authors to write these kinds of columns in JEP style proved tricky, and 
Dick and his co-authors generated a lovely stream of behavioral topics for us” (Taylor, email to author, 6 
April, 2010).  
Thaler published two series of “anomalies” papers for the Journal of Economic Perspectives that 
had the sole purpose of proclaiming that economics had serious problems regarding its theory of economic 
behavior. Each paper had a length of about 4000 words. The first series contained fourteen anomalies 
articles and appeared from the first issue of the journal in 1987 through to 1991 (The anomalies of the first 
series have been collected in The Winners Curse (1992)). The second series contained four publications and 
appeared between 1995 and 2001. Thaler’s anomalies columns provided the core of the behavioral 
economics program as it had developed from late 1983 onwards with a highly visible platform, and 
arguable served as a strong catalyst for its development.  
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 Yet, the future of the behavioral economics program was by no means self-
evident. To give the program more focus, and thereby to encourage the participating 
researchers to provide more concrete results, Wanner suggested the advisory committee 
to set up a few working groups at Russell Sage “which focus on a particular topic” 
(Wanner’s letter to the advisory committee, 16 October, 1986, RAC). Eventually, three 
non-residential working groups emerged over the course of 1987 and 1988, which would 
come to define the core of research that ascended to prominence in the economic 
discipline in the 1990s and 2000s (Heukelom 2010a). The working group on 
“Intertemporal choice” was led by Loewenstein and Jon Elster and among others resulted 
in Loewenstein and Elster’s Choice over Time (1992). The working group on “Behavioral 
approaches to financial markets” was headed by Thaler and Robert Shiller, and provided 
input for Shiller’s Market Volatility (1989) and Irrational Exuberance (2000). The 
proposed working group on experimental economics, however, proved more difficult to 
organize. Initially, the idea was to have Smith or Plott lead or co-lead a working group on 
experimental economics together with a behavioral psychologist like Kahneman, or one 
of his associates. That however did not work out because of different theoretical interests. 
Smith and Plott wanted to concentrate on the question how the market eventually steers 
individual behavior towards rational equilibrium, and what the equilibrium exactly looks 
like. Wanner, Kahneman, Thaler and the advisory committee, on the other hand, were 
more interested in how initial individual behavior deviates from the theoretically defined 
equilibrium, irrespective of whether it exists or not. In addition, Wanner, Kahneman, and 
Thaler questioned how often economic markets are allowed the time to mature towards 
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equilibrium. Thus, the plan was abandoned and in the end Colin Camerer was put in 
charge of the working group on experimental economics.  
The advisory committee and in particular Kahneman, Thaler, and Wanner were 
thus closely monitoring the content and development of the behavioral economics 
program. The focus and inclusion of disciplines in the “portfolio” of grants was carefully 
managed and Wanner was constantly looking for new researchers who might submit a 
proposal that could fit the program. Early 1987 the 1986 Sloan recipients were asked by 
Wanner and Rees to provide reports of the work they had done and were offered a chance 
to submit a proposal for a continuation of their work. As a result of the growing visibility 
of the program and as a result of Wanner’s acquisitioning the number of proposals 
submitted steadily increased. To relief the advisory committee of some of its reviewing 
work, in 1987 Wanner started to ask external researchers to review some of the proposals 
submitted. However, the process in which the advisory committee would convene once in 
a while to make decisions on the proposals received remained intact throughout, and the 
advisory committee neither was bound by the referee reports. To further support the 
advisory committee in its decision making, Thaler was invited to join for a part of the 
advisory committee meeting of 27 April, 1987, and again a few times afterwards. In 
addition, the reviewing was now divided among the advisory committee members, so that 
not all of them had to read all the proposals.  
During 1988 and 1989 the behavioral economics program continued along the 
lines developed in the years 1983-1987 and supported by two foundations. Early March 
1988 Wanner suggested that the then recently appointed Russell Sage trustee and 
economist Raiffa could join the advisory committee on an ad hoc basis, which was 
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accepted by the other advisory committee members. In addition to Thaler and Raiffa, also 
other researchers were sometimes asked to join the advisory committee meetings for one 
or a few sessions, including Kahneman. In 1989, Festinger, Rees and March stepped 
down as advisory committee members, and were replaced by Kahneman. The advisory 
committee now consisted of economists Baumol and Schelling and psychologists 
Abelson and Kahneman. In 1989 a program of visiting scholars was initiated under the 
heading of the behavioral economics program at the Russell Sage Foundation, through 
which researchers were invited to spend up to a year at the Russell Sage Foundation’s 
office in New York to collaborate on projects with other visiting scholars or to finish a 
book. Over 1989-1991 the visiting scholars program was given increasing importance by 
Wanner and the advisory committee. 1991 saw the beginning of the Russell Sage 
Foundation Behavioral Economics books series. The first book to be published in this 
series was Thaler’s Quasi-Rational Economics (1991). Eventually, eleven books were 
published, among which Loewenstein and Elster’s Choice over Time (1992), and Thaler’s 
Advances in Behavioral Finance (1993).  
Compared to the stepping down of Festinger and March, the retirement of Rees 
from the Sloan presidency and from the advisory committee because of age and 
deteriorating health had by far the most impact. As anticipated it implied the end of the 
Sloan Foundation’s support of the behavioral economics program. Thus, as of 1990, the 
behavioral economics program would continue as only a Russell Sage program. At the 
same time the amount of grant proposals submitted to the behavioral economics program 
continued to grow, up to the point in the second half of 1989 where Wanner and the 
advisory committee felt it became increasingly difficult to carefully review all the 
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incoming proposals. This growth in the number of proposals both reflected an increasing 
awareness of the behavioral economics program among psychologists and economists, 
but more importantly reflected a growing popularity of behavioral economics research. In 
order to work out how the program should continue now that it was only supported by 
Russell Sage and in order to reduce the number of grant proposals, Wanner and the 
advisory committee decided to put 1990 in the “wait and see mode.” No official calls for 
proposals would be issued, but everything that came in would be reviewed. The non-
residential working groups, the visiting researchers program and the Behavioral 
Economics Books Series, however, continued unabated. In 1991, the amount of grants 
increased again.  
But all things come to an end. Early 1992, the Russell Sage board of trustees told 
Wanner it planned to end the behavioral economics program towards the end of the year 
and to seek other purposes for the roughly 30% of the annual budget the program was 
consuming. Although Wanner judged this a fair point, he explored the possibility to save 
a part of the program in one way or another. In a first step he asked all researchers who 
had received grants or other support under the behavioral economics program between 
1984 and 1992 to briefly express to the board of trustees “whatever effect the program 
may have had on your own research” (Wanner’s letter to recipients, 30 April, 1992, 
RAC), and to “offer an appraisal of the current state of behavioral research in economics” 
(ibid). Second, Wanner asked the recipients to address “the general prospects for future 
work in behavioral economics” (ibid). The letter was sent to some ninety economists and 
psychologists. About a third of the recipients responded, among them of course those 
researchers most closely involved, such as Thaler, Kahneman, Loewenstein and Camerer. 
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It will be no surprise that their responses were positive, as exemplified among others by 
the quote from Thaler that started this article. Others, however, were less positive. In a 
long a letter to Wanner, Vernon Smith for instance severely criticized both the 
organization of the behavioral economics program and the research on which it had 
focused (Smith’s letter to Wanner, 15 May, 1992, RAC).  
In the summer of 1992, the behavioral economics program officially closed and 
the advisory committee was disbanded. Put together, however, the letters of the recipients 
convinced the board of trustees to agree to one last form of financial support through 
what would be the organizational novelty of a “Behavioral Economics Roundtable,” 
composed of former recipients of behavioral economics grants and endowed with 
$100,000 annually. To the Russell Sage Foundation the main advantage of this 
organizational novelty was that Russell Sage staff no longer would be involved in 
behavioral economics and that neither an advisory committee would be required. The 
board of trustees and Wanner agreed that the first ten members of the Behavioral 
Economics Roundtable would be elected by the former grant recipients or selected by the 
Russell Sage Foundation. Thus, in August 1992 Wanner again wrote the ninety 
recipients, asking them to cast their votes for the to-be created Behavioral Economic 
Roundtable. Two months later, the first ten members installed on the Behavioral 
Economic Roundtable were Akerlof, Blinder, Camerer, Elster, Kahneman, Loewenstein, 
Schelling, Shiller, Thaler, and Tversky. Since its creation in 1992, the Behavioral 
Economic Roundtable has been an effective promoter of behavioral economics through 
its bi-annual summer institute and its support of young researchers through a small-grants 
program. The Behavioral Economics Roundtable still exists at the time of writing.  
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4. Conclusion 
The social and behavioral sciences in the United States have had a number of patrons in 
the post war era, which exerted a substantial influence on these sciences through the 
financial means they provided (e.g. Pooley and Solovey 2010; Crowther-Heyck 2006; 
Leonard 1991; Goodwin, 1997). Yet, Crowther-Heyck’s (2006) detailed overview 
reminds us that “[t]here are many ways in which a patronage system can affect a science” 
(p.444). The primary contribution of the Sloan and Russell Sage behavioral economics 
program, then, was not the resources it provided, which were relatively modest. Instead, 
the program’s contribution lay in catalyzing “a sense of mission” in the collaboration 
between psychologists Kahneman and Tversky, economist Thaler, and their associates. It 
supported and encouraged a new scientific effort that had begun in the late 1970s with the 
publication of Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory in Econometrica, and which 
promised to continue with the collaboration between Kahneman and Thaler. With the 
retrospective wisdom of the scientific achievement of Kahneman, Thaler and behavioral 
economics, it is tempting to conclude that behavioral economics would have developed 
anyway, with or without the support of the Sloan and Russell Sage Foundations. But that 
would gloss over the efforts of Rees, Wanner and the advisory committee to bring 
economists and psychologists together and to support the research that the more regular 
research funding institutes were unwilling to support. The careful balance between 
psychologists and economists Wanner maintained both in the advisory committee, in the 
list of researchers invited and in the proposals granted ensured that neither one nor the 
other would feel dominated. Helped in part by his background in the interdisciplinary 
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cognitive research at Harvard University in the 1960s and helped also by his management 
of the Cognitive Science Series at Harvard University Press, Wanner created the 
conditions in which the interdisciplinary program of economists and psychologists could 
thrive.  
 Rees and Wanner’s strategy to pick a small group of researchers with potentially 
new and influential research and to stay with them until success had been achieved 
reflected a common strategy of post war American foundations (Jones and Rahman 2009; 
Hauptmann 2006). It was among others laid down and perfected by Weaver, a precursor 
and example to Wanner at the Sloan Foundation (e.g. Weaver 1967). The goal of this 
strategy was to develop social and behavioral science that could be employed as an agent 
of the desired societal changes the foundations wished to bring about. Initially, it was not 
exactly clear how the behavioral economics program would contribute to either the Sloan 
or the Russell Sage Foundation’s societal objectives. Changing some assumptions in 
economists’ theories did not have the direct outcome that, say, documenting poverty in 
America’s cities had. As this paper has shown, the behavioral economics program existed 
from 1984 to 1992 mainly because of Rees and Wanner. Behavioral economists’ turn to 
more clearly defined policy implications that started in the 2000s is one reason why the 
Russell Sage Foundation continues to support behavioral economics up to the present.  
 Thaler’s remark in the opening quote of this article that in 1983-1984 “behavioral 
economic essentially did not exist” (Thaler’s letter to Wanner, 27 May, 1992, RAC), is a 
slight overstatement. Simon had criticized economists in the 1950s and 1960s for more or 
less the same reasons as had Kahneman and Tversky in the 1970s. Moreover, in his letter 
to Wanner, Simon was right that his work had been followed by a substantial amount of 
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empirical research that showed where economics went descriptively off the track and 
which suggested theoretical alternatives. But Simon was also right when he wrote 
Wanner than economists simply failed to pay attention. By giving Kahneman, Thaler and 
their associates “a sense of mission,” Wanner’s behavioral economics program helped to 
ensure that economists now came to pay attention.       
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